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This paper seeks to explain a previously unnoticed semantic
phenomenon illustrated by the contrast between (1)7 am the oldest of
my enemies, which presupposes that the speaker is one of his or her
own enemies, versus (2) / am the oldest ofmy siblings, which for most
speakers does not presuppose that the speaker is his or her own sib-
ling. I argue that the behavior of (2) is the result of temporarily enlarg-
ing the extension of the predicate (sibling) in order to meet an other-
wise unsatisfiable presupposition. I propose that this temporary ac-
commodation occurs only with lexical and complex predicates whose
denotations are of a certain mathematical class that I call quasi-equiv-
alence relations. I also briefly discuss a number of closely related con-
struction types, and draw out the functional motivation for this un-
usual type of grammaticized accommodation.
). Introduction
interpretation clearly depends on context. Typically, context restricts the range of
nterpretation: thanks to context, ambiguity is resolved, reference is determined,
ind vagueness is constrained. This paper suggests that under certain very specific
:onditions, context can enlarge rather than restrict the extension of a predicate,
rhe phenomenon in question is illustrated by the semantic contrast in (1):
(1) a. I am the oldest of my enemies.
b. I am the oldest of my children.
c. I am the oldest of my siblings.
(la) entails (presupposes, actually — see the discussion below in section 2)
that I am one of my own enemies. Similarly, (lb) presupposes that I am one of my
awn children, and therefore is infelicitous, or at best a contradiction (ignoring the
possibility of time travel paradoxes), (lc) ought to be just like (lb): since I am no
more my own sibling than I am my own child, we should naturally expect (lc) to
also be infelicitous or contradictory. However, native speakers robustly judge (lc)
to be significantly more acceptable than (lb), and capable of being true. 1
(lc) only makes sense if the speaker is considered to be one of the speaker's
siblings, so that the truth conditions of (lc) are equivalent to the truth conditions
of the sentence / am the oldest of my parents' children. However, unlike the
entailment that I am my own enemy in (la), uttering (lc) does not commit me to
the claim that I am my own sibling. Somehow, the speaker of (lc) is exceptionally
4 Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 29: 1 (Spring 1999)
allowed to temporarily count as their own sibling, just for the purposes of
comparing ages, immediately after which the normal irreflexive meaning of
siblinghood is restored. For the purposes of this paper, let's call this a pro
tempore reading, or less fancily, a temporary reading: something about the lin-
guistic context provided by (lc) allows sibling to temporarily mean something
different than it normally does.
Many authors have suggested that specific constructions can affect the |
interpretation of a predicate in context. For instance, Kadmon (1990:312) argues
that some definite descriptions behave as if they contained descriptive content
beyond what is overtly expressed. Building on Lewis' 1979 notion of accommo-
dation (discussed below in section 2), Kadmon allows for the semantic inter-
polation of additional restrictive material in order to satisfy the uniqueness pre-
supposition associated with the use of a definite description. Thus in an appro-
priate context, a definite description like the man can give rise to truth conditions
equivalent to the man I was talking to.
Like Kadmon, I will suggest that the pro tern reading of (lc) is a kind of
accommodation triggered by a presupposition. The main difference that I would
like to draw attention to between the pro tern accommodation discussed in this
paper and the type of accommodation proposed by Kadmon and others is that
here the pro tern reading results in an enlargement of the property rather than a
restriction.
Thus the potential interest of the phenomenon illustrated in (1) is that it
seems to be a highly unusual combination of a construction-specific, presuppo-
sition-triggered accommodation that results in enlargement of the extension of a
predicate rather than restriction. Furthermore, as if in recognition of the un-
naturalness of predicate enlargement, unlike traditional accommodation, the effect
of this type of accommodation is rescinded immediately after the superlative has
been evaluated (i.e., the effect is temporary).
1. Reciprocal interpretations of relational nouns
Clearly, something about (lc) is different, and gives special dispensation for (lc)
to mean what it means. The obvious starting point is to investigate semantic dif-
ferences between the meanings of the predicates involved. For instance, sibling,
but not children or enemies, is one of the relational nouns that Eschenbach
(1993) classifies as capable of a reciprocal interpretation.
(2) a. The sister walked in.
^
b. The sisters walked in.
c. The daughters walked in.
Eschenbach observes that (2a) is felicitous only in a context in which we feel that
we know exactly whose sister is involved. Not surprisingly, the plural use in (2b)
can have a similar interpretation: let's say that we are talking about Warren
Beaty's sister and Rosanna Arquette's sister. Then we can use (2b) to describe a
situation in which Shirley MacLean and Patricia Arquette (who are not related to
each other) enter the room.
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But (2b) also has a reading that does not require any special context,
provided that the reading is reciprocal, that is, provided that the sisters are all
sisters of each other. In this case, each woman satisfies the has-a-sister pre-
supposition with respect to her siblings. It is not clear whether this way of con-
struing relational predicates constitutes a bone fide ambiguity, or whether the
reciprocal interpretation is merely an especially common, convenient, and tidy
way for a situation to satisfy the presuppositions of sentences like (2b);
fortunately, we do not need to resolve this question for our purposes here.
Other predicates, of course, may not be consistent with the possibility of a
reciprocal reading. For instance, consider the denotation of daughter. It is not
possible to find a finite set of daughters such that each member of the set is the
daughter of some other woman in the group. This makes a reciprocal interpre-
tation impossible, and indeed (2c) has only a discourse-controlled interpretation.
As we will see, compatibility with receiving a reciprocal interpretation seems
to be a necessary condition for a pro tern reading to arise. Thus the fact that the
predicate children in (lb) does not have a reciprocal interpretation allows us to
correctly predict that (lb) does not have a pro tern reading. However, although
having a reciprocal reading may be necessary for a pro tern reading to be possible,
it is not sufficient:
(3) She's the oldest of her brothers.
If (3) were ever felicitous, it certainly could never be true, even if we construe
brother under a reciprocal interpretation. Thus it takes more than just a relational
noun under a reciprocal interpretation to produce a pro tern reading, and we must
look further for a more complete explanation.
2. Triggering a pro tem reading: Accommodating a presupposition
What else must be present in order for a pro tem reading to be possible or
necessary? Note that a sentence like (lc) but formed with a comparative rather
than a superlative does not have a pro tem reading: / am older than my siblings
does not involve any suggestion that I am older than myself. Therefore I will
assume that the presence of the superlative is essential.
Superlatives denote properties of individuals. Predicating a superlative
property of an individual presupposes that that individual is a legitimate member
of the set undergoing comparison.
(4) a. He is the stupidest criminal I've ever met.
b. He isn't the stupidest criminal I've ever met.
c. Is he the stupidest criminal I've ever met?
In the sentences in (4), the set undergoing comparison is the set of criminals. The
crucial thing to note is that whether or not the referent of the subject of these
sentences happens to be stupid, a use of any of these three sentences presup-
poses that he is at least a criminal. This suggests the following hypothesis:
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(5) The superlative applicability presupposition: a use of a super-
lative [A-est N] (e.g., stupid-est criminal) presupposes that any entity
of which the property denoted by the superlative is predicated must
be in the extension of the nominal property N.
I'm not aware of any previous mention of such a presupposition associated with
superlatives, but its existence is clear enough. As evidence that the implication is
a presupposition rather than an at-issue entailment, recall that the hallmark of
j
presuppositions is that they remain constant under negation and question-forma-
tion. Since (4a), its negation in (4b), and the associated yes/no question in (4c) all
guarantee that the subject is a criminal, I conclude that we are indeed dealing
with a presupposition.
If (5) is a valid assumption, then a use of (lc) presupposes that the speaker is
a member of the relevant set of siblings. In addition, this is why (la) entails that
the speaker is their own enemy, and why (lb) is contradictory. It also explains
why (3) is infelicitous: the presupposition that the subject is a brother (and there-
fore male) is inconsistent with the gender marking on the pronoun in subject
position.
We can now recognize that the pro tern reading in (lc) serves as a way of
satisfying the superlative applicability presupposition by extending the set of sib-
lings to include the speaker. In other words, we can view the pro tern reading as a
form of accommodation.
(6) Lewis 1979:340: Accommodation: If at time t something is said
that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not pre-
supposed just before t, then—ceteris paribus and within certain limits-
presupposition P comes into existence at t.
Accommodation often results in adding entities (or at least discourse referents) to
a model. In the traditional example, definite descriptions presuppose the existence
of the described entity. If a speaker asserts that the King of France is (or isn't)
bald, and we have no specific knowledge to the contrary, a cooperative listener
will accommodate the existence presupposition by behaving as if France does
indeed have a king. In formal terms, this amounts to adding an entity to the do-
main of discourse having the requisite properties.
Unfortunately, the conditions under which accommodation occurs can be
fluid and elusive.
(7) a. My uncle is visiting me (Presupposition: I have an uncle.) i
this week.
b. Sorry I'm late, my (Presupposition: I have a firetruck.)
firetruck broke down.
As Prince 1979 observes, accommodation in (7a) is highly natural and effortless,
even without any reason to believe that the speaker has an uncle; however, it is
much less likely that even a cooperative listener will be willing to postulate that
the speaker possesses a firetruck. The difference between (7a) and (7b), obvi-
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ously, is plausibility: it is much more likely that the speaker has an uncle than a
firetruck.
Even if accommodation is sometimes sensitive to pragmatic plausibility,
there may be situations in which accommodation is automatic, that is, conven-
tional or grammaticized. Kadmon's proposed accommodation of uniqueness
properties, mentioned above, is an example. As a second example, quantificational
possessives arguably involve automatic accommodation: when we process a
sentence like Most people's dogs sleep indoors, thanks to the existence
presupposition due to the possessive, we automatically accommodate the as-
sumption that the only relevant people for the purposes of quantification are
people who possess dogs (see Barker 1995, chapter 4 for discussion). My claim
here is that pro-tem readings are another instance of automatic accommodation
associated with a specific class of constructions.
3. Equivalence relations and quasi-equivalence relations
Let's return to the main contrast between (lb) and (lc). What is the relevant
difference between siblinghood and childhood? The first answer that a number of
colleagues have suggested to me, and the one that I favor myself, is that the sib-
linghood but not childhood is tantamount to an equivalence relation—that is,
sibling and similar predicates are what I will call a quasi-equivalence relation, as
defined immediately below.
A true equivalence relation is transitive, symmetric, and reflexive. Because
the sibling relation is anti-reflexive, it fails to qualify as an equivalence relation.
That is, no one counts as their own sibling (hence / am my own sibling is a
contradiction). However, when comparing the sibling relation to the smallest
equivalence relation containing it, the reflexive pairs are all that are missing.
(8) a. quasi-equivalence relation (sibling):
{ <j, m> , <m, j> , < m, t >, < t, m >, < j, t >, < t, j >
}
b. smallest equivalence relation containing (a):
{ <j, m> , <m, j> , < m, t >, < t, m >, < j, t >,
<Lj>, <j,j>, <m, m>,<Lt> }
The extension of the sibling relation is a quasi-equivalence relation in the sense
that it lacks only reflexive pairs in order to be a true equivalence relation. For in-
stance, the possible extension for sibling given in (8a) lacks only the reflexive
pairs <j, j> , <m, m> , and < t,t > in order to be a complete equivalence relation like
the one given in (8b). More precisely, for the purposes of this paper, a quasi-
equivalence relation is any relation whose reflexive closure is an equivalence
relation.
If sibling denoted a genuine equivalence relation, no accommodation
would be necessary in order for (lc) to be felicitous: since the speaker would be a
member of the set of the speaker's siblings, the superlative presupposition men-
tioned above would be satisfied. Perhaps, then, a pro tern reading is available only
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when the property in question is sufficiently close to being an equivalence rela-
tion. In some sense, quasi-equivalence relations are as close as you can come to
an equivalence relations without being one.
Developing this thought further, it is interesting that, for whatever reason,
natural languages seem to avoid expressing equivalence relations. Of course, it is
possible to construct a somewhat awkward equivalence relation compositionally.
For instance, the equivalence relation given in (8b) might be the extension of the I
relation corresponding to the string has the same number of legs as; but note
that the words expressing this relation do not even form a constituent. In fact,
there may not be any monomorphemic predicates expressing an equivalence rela-
tion, except perhaps for the degenerate case of equational be (assuming that be
has a sense that can adequately be expressed by the identity relation, which is
trivially an equivalence relation).
Thus not only are predicates denoting quasi-equivalence relations, like
sibling, close to equivalence relations—they may be as close to an equivalence
relation as it's possible for a nominal predicate to get. If natural languages
allowed non-trivial lexical equivalence relations, presumably sibling would be
one of them. The hypothesis under consideration, then, is that it is this closeness
to an equivalence relation that makes a pro-tern reading possible for (lc). For
comparison, adding reflexive pairs to the child relation (i.e., assuming that people
count pro tempore as their own children) does much more violence to the content
of the childhood concept, which gives a hint as to why (lb) does not have a pro-
tein reading.
What about other types of near-equivalence relation?
(9) a. I am the oldest of my correspondents,
b. I am the oldest of my partners.
If Alice corresponds with Bob (in the sense of exchanging email), then Bob
corresponds with Alice; thus the relation is symmetric. But if Alice corresponds
with Bob and Bob corresponds with Carol, there is no guarantee that Alice cor-
responds with Carol. This means that the correspondent relation does not guar-
antee any degree of transitivity. (9a) shows that symmetry without a sufficient
degree of transitivity does not give rise to a pro tern reading, since (9a) sounds
contradictory.
(9b), on the other hand, can have a pro tern reading, but only if the speaker
has more than one partner at the time of evaluation. That is, (9b) can mean only /
that the speaker is the oldest of her current co-partners in a specific venture, and
™
the other partners must be partners of each other. It cannot be used to express the
thought that over the years the speaker has always been older than her various
partners.
(10) a. Quasi-equivalence relations: siblings, colleagues, brothers,
roommates, classmates, lovers, partners, etc.
b. symmetric relations that are not quasi-equivalence relations:
correspondents, friends, spouses, etc.
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The relational nouns in (10a) are both symmetric and near-transitive (relative to
any specific situation), and give rise to pro tern readings; the relational nouns in
(10a) are symmetric but not sufficiently transitive to count as quasi-equivalence
relations, and do not give rise to pro tern readings.
To summarize, we have the following hypothesis for explaining when pro-
tein readings are available.
(11) A superlative applicability presupposition (as defined in (5) in
section 2 above) will be automatically but only temporarily accom-
modated just in case the predicate describing the comparison set
denotes a quasi-equivalence relation R and the entity to which the
superlative is applied is in the smallest equivalence relation containing
R.
Thus in (lc) (= / am the oldest of my siblings), the predicate describing the
comparison set is siblings, which clearly denotes a quasi-equivalence relation R.
Furthermore, the reflexive closure of R contains the speaker. Therefore (11) cor-
rectly predicts that ( lc) is capable of giving rise to a pro tern reading.
4. Other constructions
Does this pro tern effect generalize to other constructions? That is, if we find a
construction in which predicating something presupposes the applicability of the
predicate, will we detect pro tern effects?
Some other comparative constructions presuppose the applicability of their
component properties. For instance, if I claim that I am a richer chess player than
you are, I presuppose that both you and I play chess. Interestingly, these con-
structions also seem to give rise to pro tern readings:
(12) a. You won't find a happier one of my colleagues than me.
b. You won't find a richer colleague of mine than me.
c. You're the only one of your colleagues who cares about teaching.
d. You're the one of your colleagues that I like (the most).
Thus for instance (12a) and (12b) can be felicitous and true even though speaker
cannot be considered to be his own colleague.
One thing that all of these examples have in common with the prototypical
pro tern construction is that they all involve a partitive construction (see Barker
1998 for arguments that one of my colleagues and colleague of mine are
partitives).
It is also worth noting that the predicate in question need not be a simple
lexical predicate:
(13) a. I am the oldest of [all my siblings].
b. I am the oldest of my [male siblings].
c. I am the oldest of my [brothers and sisters].
d. You are by far the nicest of your [senior colleagues].
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The only requirement is that the resulting complex predicate have for its exten-
sion (at every world-time index) a quasi-equivalence relation, and this is the case
for the examples in (13). Note that although (13d) does not entail that the ad-
dressee is her own senior colleague, it does entail that she is senior. This is exactly
what we would expect given the near-equivalence requirement: the addressee
must be a senior colleague of her senior colleagues.
If modification disrupts the near-equivalence property, however, it also I
disrupts the availability of a pro tern interpretation. Assume that the speaker of
(13) is one of exactly four brothers:
(14) I am the oldest of my three brothers.
Allowing the speaker to count as one of his own brothers even temporarily
produces a set that no longer has cardinality 3; this semantic conflict significantly
degrades the acceptability of (14).
5. Conclusion
The surprisingly high degree of acceptability of (lc) suggests that some natural
language predicates such as the meaning of sibling are at some deep conceptual
level true equivalence relations. This aspect of their semantic nature is masked at a
relatively superficial level, perhaps in alignment with what may be a systematic
(perhaps universal?) tendency for nominal relations to avoid reflexive denota-
tions. Under the stress of an otherwise unsatisfiable presupposition, this deeper
nature can peek through, allowing expressions that denote quasi-equivalence
relations to denote complete equivalence relations—but only temporarily, just
long enough to evaluate the expression that gives rise to the presupposition.
NOTES
* Thanks for comments and advice from Chris Kennedy and Peter Lasersohn.
1 My characterization of the empirical facts may turn out to be too strong. A more
conservative claim would be that (lc) is an instance of speaking loosely, in the
sense discussed by Lasersohn [Forthcoming]. After all, we can assert a sentence
like The townspeople are asleep even when a few isolated souls remain awake,
provide that the few people who are awake can safely be ignored for practical
purposes. Perhaps, then, (lc) is acceptable because it is close enough to being
true relative to some pragmatic standard. Yet merely classifying (lc) as an in- a
stance of speaking loosely is not enough; the challenge for such an approach is
"
to explain what in particular makes (lc) close enough to being true when (lb) is
not. The reader should consider the additional examples given in (12) in section 4
before making up his or her mind about the status of (lc).
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